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Abstract
The historically-influential perceptual analogy states that intuitions and perceptual
experiences  are  alike  in  many  important  respects.  Phenomenalists  defend  a
particular  reading  of  this  analogy  according  to  which  intuitions  and  perceptual
experiences  share a common  phenomenal character.  Call this the 'phenomenalist
thesis'.  The  phenomenalist  thesis  has  proven  highly  influential  in  recent  years.
However, insufficient attention has been given to the challenges it raises for theories
of intuition. In this paper, I first develop one such challenge. I argue that if we take
the idea  that  intuitions  and  perceptual  experiences  have  a  common phenomenal
character seriously, then a version of the familiar  problem of perceptual presence
arises for intuitions. I call this the 'problem of intuitive presence'. In the second part
of the paper I sketch a novel enactivist solution to this problem.
Keywords:  Intuition,  Phenomenology,  Perceptual  Presence,  Imagination,
Enactivism
1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been much enthusiasm with questions about the nature and epistemology of
intuitions. These questions have themselves animated a host of thorny first-order philosophical disputes in
(among  others)  epistemology,  philosophy  of  mind,  and  moral  philosophy,  as  well  as  second-order
discussions about the goals and methods of philosophy itself.1 However, many have expressed contempt
for the philosophical study of intuition. A common complaint is that intuition is an inherently mysterious
or  (at  best)  elusive phenomenon.  Building  on these and other  similar  kinds of  critiques,  some have
* Forthcoming in Philosophers’ Imprint. Many thanks to two anonymous referees and the editorial team at this journal for their
excellent suggestions; to Ole Koksvik, Giovanni Rolla, and friends at Tilburg University for discussions on this material; and
to Yuri Cath for his encouragement and support at the very early stages of development of this paper.
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claimed that talk of a category of mental states called ‘intuition’ is simply confused and that appeal to it
has given rise to what are effectively philosophical pseudo-problems.2 One common line of response to
these kinds of complaints has been to appeal to the historically-influential perceptual analogy: the idea
that  intuitions  and  perceptual  experiences  are  alike  in  many  important  respects.  Proponents  of  this
analogy claim that by framing the putatively elusive features of intuitions in terms of the more tangible
and concrete structures of perception, we can shed light on their nature and epistemology. For instance,
phenomenalists about intuition claim that we can make progress in the study about intuition once we
recognise that intuitions and perceptual experiences share a common phenomenal character. Call this the
'phenomenalist thesis'.
Despite the growing popularity of the phenomenalist thesis, insufficient attention has been given to the
potential problems it raises for theories of intuitions. A quick survey of the literature in the philosophy of
perception reveals an array of problems in accounting for the phenomenology of perceptual experiences.
This then raises the question: if we take the phenomenalist thesis seriously, would structurally similar
problems arise for theories of intuitions as well? I will argue that the answer is ‘yes’. I focus on the well-
known  problem  of  perceptual  presence.  My  aim  will  be  to  show  that  commonalities  in  the
phenomenology of intuition and perceptual experience suggest that a structurally similar problem arises
for theories of intuition. I call  this the ‘problem of  intuitive presence’. I  then go on to argue that an
enactivist account of intuitions stands the best chance of solving this problem.
Here is a plan for the paper. I first explain and motivate the phenomenalist thesis (sec. 2). I then introduce
the problem of perceptual presence (sec. 3) and articulate the structurally similar problem of intuitive
presence (sec. 4). Lastly (sec. 5), I survey solutions to the problem of perceptual presence and explore
whether analogous proposals prove effective against the problem of intuitive presence. I conclude by
suggesting that future inquiry on the nature of intuitions should focus on developing an enactivist view of
intuitions.
2. The phenomenalist thesis
According to a widely shared view, perceptual experiences are mental states characterised in part by their
distinctive phenomenal character. Proponents of this view have adopted a variety of labels to describe this
feature of perceptual experiences. For example, some define it  as a kind of phenomenal or assertoric
'force' which makes it seem as if one could tell that the contents of perceptual experiences are true (Pryor,
2 See, e.g., Cappelen (2012, pp.25–94)
2000; Huemer, 2001; Heck, 2000). Others define it instead in terms of the feeling of being 'pulled' or
‘pushed' to assent (Sosa, 2007, p.47; Koksvik, 2020), or as of being immediately  presented with how
things are in the world (Chudnoff, 2013; Bengson, 2015). Despite important differences among these
many descriptions,  they all  share  a common core  claim:  namely,  that  perceptual  experiences  have a
phenomenology that purports to reveal the world to us (Siegel and Silins, 2015). Examples prove helpful
to clarify this phenomenal character of perceptual experiences. 
Suppose you see a purple wall in front of you. You carefully examine its shape, textures, and the way in
which its hue changes slightly as you move your eyes across its surface. Now compare this with the case
in which you just imagine a purple wall in front of you. What is the difference between seeing the purple
wall and imagining it? Here is one important difference: whereas your perceptual experience will seem to
reveal to you that there is a wall right there, your imaginative exercise will fail to do so. At most, your
imagination  will  make  you  aware  of  an  internal representation  of  a  wall.  Similarly,  supposing  or
assuming there is a wall in front of you will not reveal a wall to you in the same way that your perceptual
experience does. Instead, it will at most make you entertain the possibility that this proposition is true.
And even if you come to believe or judge that there is a wall in front of you, this belief or judgement will
at most represent that this is true—but will lack the phenomenology that makes it seem as if the wall is
revealed to you.
Phenomenalists about intuition argue that similar examples prove apt to characterise the phenomenology
of intuitions. By comparing and contrasting intuitions with other mental states, they seek to establish that
intuitions have a phenomenology that is strikingly similar to that of perceptual experiences (Chudnoff,
2013; Bengson, 2015; Koksvik, 2020). Phenomenalists diverge in how they flesh out this proposal and in
how they characterise this phenomenology.3 But it is important to emphasise that such disagreements are
set against a backdrop of substantial consensus (Koksvik, 2017). Yet, there is still no well-established
vocabulary to capture such points of agreement. I propose one such vocabulary here: I contend that a core
claim  of  all  phenomenalist  accounts  is  that,  like  perceptual  experiences,  intuitions  also  have  a
phenomenology  that  purports  to  reveal the  world  to  us.4 Accordingly,  I  take  it  that  the  examples
3  For a detailed review of these accounts, see Koksvik (2017).
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phenomenalists use to articulate their claims prove apt to illustrate at least this phenomenal feature of
intuitions. To explain, consider the example from Chudnoff (2013, p.50), who invites readers to entertain
the following proposition:
P1 Two circles can have at most two common points.
Chudnoff claims that after considering P1, readers will likely visualise two circles intersecting and that
this  will  elicit  an  intuition  that  P1  is  true.  Moreover,  he  points  out  that  this  intuition  will  have  a
phenomenology that is strikingly similar to that of perceptual experiences. Now, Chudnoff's claim is not
that imagining two circles intersecting will itself seem to reveal to you this mathematical fact; rather, his
contention  is  that  this  episode  of  imagining  gives  rise to  an  intuition  which  has  this  characteristic
phenomenology. In line with my proposed terminology, I take Chudnoff to be saying that, similar to how
a perceptual experience of a purple wall seems to simply reveal the purple wall to you, your intuition that
P1 is true (and not your visualisation) seems to reveal to you the mathematical fact that two circles have
at  most  two common points.  By contrast,  Chudnoff  claims that  considering the following alternative
proposition is unlikely to elicit a mental state with a similar phenomenology:
P2 If a quadrilateral is inscribed in a circle, the sum of the products of the two pairs of opposite sides is
equal to the product of the diagonals.
After  reading  P2,  readers  might  be  puzzled  or  curious  about  whether  this  proposition  is  true;  but,
considering it will most likely not seem to reveal to you whether P2 is true or false. And even if one may
come to believe or judge that P2 is true by arriving at some proof of this claim, this belief or judgement
will  be  importantly  distinct  from an intuition that  P2 is  true—which would purportedly immediately
reveal this claim to be true.
Bengson (2015)  adopts  a  similar  argumentative  strategy in  support  of  his  phenomenalist  account  of
intuitions. One of the examples he appeals to in order to motivate this account is the well-known Gettier
case. The following is one variation of this thought-experiment:
Goldfinch: Arjun sees what appears to be a goldfinch on the tree. He then comes to believe that there is
a goldfinch there. Unbeknownst  to him, Arjun sees only a cardboard cut-out  of a goldfinch behind
which there is a real goldfinch hidden completely out of sight. Does Arjun know there is a goldfinch in
the tree?
Bengson's (2015, p.711) suggestion is that Gettier intuitions—such as the intuition that Arjun does not
know there is a goldfinch on the tree—will bear important similarities to perceptual experiences. In line
with the vocabulary proposed above, I take Bengson's claim to mean that, similar to how your perceptual
experience of a purple wall will seem to reveal a wall in front of you, your intuition about Goldfinch will
purport to  reveal to you that Arjun does not know there is a goldfinch on the tree. Moreover, Bengson
(2015, p.717) contends this intuition will be importantly different from the mental state that ensues after
considering the following claim:
P3 1729 is the smallest number expressible as the sum of two positive cubes in two different ways.
Bengson expects that readers will not have a mental state with a similar phenomenology as an intuition
about a Gettier case. That is, considering P3 will unlikely elicit a mental state that seems to reveal to you
that this is true or false. And although one might even come to believe and judge P3 to be true (say, after
going through some calculations), the resulting mental state will be rather different from an intuition like
the one had in response to Goldfinch.
Relying on a host  of  other similar  examples (all  of  which purport  to show a marked contrast  in the
phenomenology of intuitions and of other mental states), phenomenalists seek to establish that intuitions
and perceptual experiences are mental states defined (in part) by their common phenomenal character
(Chudnoff,  2013;  Bengson,  2015;  Koksvik,  2020).  In  line  with  the  discussion  above,  I  propose  we
interpret this thesis in terms of the claim that both intuitions and perceptual experiences have a distinctive
phenomenology that seems to reveal the world to us.
For  the  sake  of  argument,  I  will  grant  this  phenomenalist  thesis  in  what  follows.  Thus,  I  use  the
unqualified term ‘intuition’ to refer to mental states that have the phenomenology that purports to reveal
the world to us. My aim is to explore a heretofore neglected facet of this proposal: namely, that if we take
the perceptual analogy seriously (in the way that phenomenalists develop it), then a version of the well-
known problem of perceptual presence arises for theories of intuition. As a first step to developing this
claim, I begin by giving a brief overview of discussions about the problem of perceptual presence.
3. The problem of perceptual presence
Suppose you are now looking at a red apple under ordinary visibility conditions: lighting is good, you are
facing the apple straight-on, there are no mirrors around, etc. In these conditions, you will likely have a
visual experience that seems to reveal a red apple to you (one which you could pick up and eat if you so
pleased). Now consider: what if what you were looking at was just a red apple-peel, perfectly positioned
to look just like an apple? Would you be able to tell? That is, would you recognise you were not looking
at an apple but just a well positioned apple-peel? Most likely not.
Consider another case. Suppose you are blindfolded and handed an object. As soon as you grab it, you
have the perceptual experience that seems to reveal that you are holding a large glass bottle. Now suppose
that what you were handed was just a curved piece of heavy glass in the exact shape of your hand. If this
were the case, would you realise that you were holding a well-positioned piece of glass rather than a
whole bottle? Again, most likely not.
These examples underscore a puzzling fact: although our perceptual experiences seem to reveal whole
three-dimensional objects to us, the visual stimuli we receive from them is greatly restricted. We seem to
be visually aware of a whole voluminous apple; but it is patently clear that we receive visual stimuli from
only its front face. We seem to be aware of a whole bottle in our hands; yet, we receive tactile stimuli
from only the part of the bottle that is in contact with our hand. Since we receive sensory stimuli from
only the front face of an apple, why does our visual experience not seem to reveal to us an apple-part
instead—i.e.,  something that could be either a whole voluminous apple or a perfectly well-positioned
apple-peel? Similarly, why does our tactile experience seem to reveal to us a whole bottle and not just a
bottle-part—something which could be either a whole bottle, or just a heavy piece of glass of the exact
shape of our hands? Do we just assume, judge or believe that we perceive a whole apple or bottle, or is
there some other explanation for why our perceptual experience seems to reveal to us more than the
sensory stimuli we receive from the world? These are the questions that characterise the ‘problem of
perceptual presence' (Noë, 2004; Leddington, 2009; Kind, 2018).
Two clarifications about this problem are in order. First, it is important to emphasise that the problem of
perceptual  presence  is  a  puzzle  about  the  nature of  perceptual  experiences—in  particular  of  their
phenomenology.  An  adequate  solution  to  this  problem  must  account  for  the  fact  that  perceptual
experiences seem to reveal more to us than the sensory stimuli we receive from the world. The problem of
perceptual presence is thus not itself about the epistemology of perceptual experiences. This is not to say
that  solutions  to  this  problem  have  no  bearing  on  debates  about  the  epistemology  of  perceptual
experiences. But these epistemological questions are secondary to the primary issue of the nature of such
experiences.
Second, the problem of perceptual presence relates to another (distinct) prominent issue about the nature
of  perception:  namely,  that  of  what is  the  object  of  experience (Clarke,  1965;  Strawson,  1988).  For
instance, when looking at the front face of the apple, do you actually perceive an apple or only the front
face of an apple (i.e., some object which is shared by apples and perfectly well-positioned apple-peels)?
Solutions to the problem of perceptual presence are orthogonal to this more robust ontological matter.
The problem here is that of accounting for the phenomenology of perceptual experiences. And note that
the phenomenology of our perceptual experience of an apple remains unchanged, regardless of whether
the object of experience is an apple or merely an apple-surface. In both cases, you will seem to see a
whole voluminous apple in front of you.
In  sum,  the  problem of  perceptual  presence  is  a  puzzle  about  the  nature  of  the  phenomenology  of
perceptual experiences. In particular, it concerns the question of what accounts for the fact that perceptual
experiences purport to reveal objects out in the world to us, even though it  is patently clear that we
receive sensory stimuli from only parts of those objects at any one time. In the next section, I explain how
a version of the problem of perceptual presence arises for phenomenalist theories of intuitions.
4. The problem of intuitive presence
As  a  first  step  to  developing  the  arguments  in  this  section,  let's  once  more  consider  the  examples
discussed in the previous sections. First:
P1 Two circles can have at most two common points.
As already discussed, Chudnoff claims that considering P1 will likely prompt the reader to visualise two
circles intersecting, and that this will elicit the intuition that P1 is true. I want to focus on some important
details  of  this  series  of  mental  events.  In  particular,  I  want  to  call  attention to  the  fact  that  in  this
imaginative exercise,  you will  have considered no more than one concrete  realisation of  two circles
intersecting. Even so, your visualisation will suffice to elicit an intuition that seems to reveal to you that
for  every pair of circles, they will intersect in at most two points. With these considerations in mind, I
want to now highlight some structural commonalities between this intuition and the kinds of cases used to
motivate the problem of perceptual presence.
Recall  that  the  problem  of  perceptual  presence  gains  traction  in  light  of  examples  of  perceptual
experiences that purport to reveal to us whole objects, even though it is patently clear that we receive
sensory stimuli  from only parts  of  those  objects  at  any  one time.  Similar  observations  prove apt  to
characterise  your  intuition  about  P1.  That  is  because  your  intuition  will  seem to  reveal  to  you  the
purported mathematical fact that every pair of circles have at most two common points, even though it is
clear that you do not entertain all and every case of how two circles can intersect. For instance, you did
not  consider  circles  in  non-euclidean  geometry,  or  circles  mapped  onto  three-dimensional  planes.
Nevertheless, your intuition about P1 will have a phenomenology that seems to reveal to you a universal
fact about  all circles. In effect, this demonstrates that the intuition that P1 is true has a phenomenology
that  greatly  outstrips  the  small  set  of  concrete  examples  which  you  explicitly  entertained  in  your
imaginative exercise.  How do we account for this  gap between your intuition and what  you directly
entertain in your mind? Do you have this intuition because you believe, judge, or simply infer that all
pairs of circles will be like the ones visualised? Or is there some other explanation for the fact that your
intuition  outstrips  your  visualisation  of  this  one  set  of  circles  intersecting?  These  are  the  kinds  of
questions that characterise what I call the 'problem of intuitive presence'.
To further elucidate the nature of the problem of intuitive presence, consider another example. Previously,
we looked at the case of Goldfinch in which Arjun sees a cardboard cut-out of a goldfinch hanging on a
tree behind which there is a real goldfinch hidden (sec. 2). As already discussed, considering a Gettier
case like  Goldfinch will  elicit  an intuition that  the  character  in  this  scenario will  not  know a given
proposition (in this case, that Arjun does not know there to be a goldfinch on the tree). I want to again
consider details of this progression of mental events.  First,  in considering the scenario described, the
reader will bring to mind those things  explicitly mentioned in the scenario (e.g., that Arjun is walking
through a grove, that there is both a goldfinch cut-out and a goldfinch on the tree, etc.) plus some other
small details (e.g., that Arjun has two eyes and that the tree has leaves). Second, after being prompted to
assess whether Arjun knows there is a goldfinch in the tree, it will likely seem to the reader that he does
not know as much.
Once  more,  I  want  to  draw out  some  commonalities between this  intuition  and cases  of  perceptual
experience that  outstrip  the  sensory stimuli  received from the environment.  Note  that  although your
intuition seems to reveal to you that Arjun does not know there is a goldfinch on the tree, you most likely
did  not  explicitly  consider  this  when  entertaining  the  details  of  this  scenario.  After  all,  nowhere  in
Goldfinch is there any mention that Arjun's predicament rules out that he knows there is a goldfinch on
the tree. Indeed, as many have observed, it is perfectly compatible with the case of Goldfinch that Arjun
knows as much (Williamson, 2007; Ichikawa and Jarvis, 2009; Malmgren, 2011; Saint-Germier, 2019).
For instance, suppose Arjun knows that in this grove he strolls through, people tend to put up goldfinch
cut-outs and that in all such trees there is always at least one real goldfinch. Arjun thus presumably knows
that even if he is mistaken about whether he sees a real goldfinch or just a cut-out on a tree, he is sure
there will be one real goldfinch on it. Arjun would then arguably know that there is a goldfinch on the
tree. And note that this is just one among a host of ways in which we can "fill in" Goldfinch to make it the
case that Arjun knows this. This then underscores a gap between what the scenario of Goldfinch describes
and what your intuition about this case seems to reveal to you—viz., that Arjun actually doesn't know
there is a goldfinch on the tree. Your intuition about  Goldfinch thus has a phenomenology that greatly
outstrips  the  details  of  the  scenario  which  you entertained.  Again,  I  contend  that  insofar  as  similar
considerations motivate thinking there is a problem of perceptual presence, then we should think that an
analogous problem of intuitive presence arises for theories of intuition.
So, there are important commonalities between some representative cases of intuitions and instances of
perceptual experience that characterise the problem of perceptual presence. The perceptual experiences in
question purport to reveal objects in the world to us, even though we receive stimuli from only some parts
of those objects. Similarly, I have argued that some representative cases of intuition seem to reveal to us
things we do not (or cannot) directly entertain in our minds. Thus, I contend that a version of the problem
of perceptual presence arises for theories of intuitions. This is the problem of intuitive presence.
For the remainder of this  paper,  I  explore solutions to the problem of intuitive presence.  But before
proceeding, it is important to highlight  a structural difference between this problem and the problem of
perceptual presence. To explain, consider again an example of the latter: your perceptual experience that
there is an apple in front of you after you receive sensory stimuli from its front face. As we saw, this case
raises the question of why you have one kind of perceptual experience rather than another: namely, why
do you have a perceptual experience of an apple (which greatly outstrips the information received from
the environment) rather than a perceptual experience of just an apple's front face (which better tracks the
sensory  stimuli  received)?  This  is  the  kind  of  question  that  characterises  the  problem of  perceptual
presence.  Now, consider the case in which visualising one concrete realisation of circles intersecting
gives rise to an intuition that P1 is true. Note that this progression of mental events raises a structurally
different  question:  namely,  why  does  being  in  one  kind  of  mental  state  with  a  certain  content  (a
visualisation  of  circles  intersecting)  cause  another kind  of  mental  state  with  a  content  that  greatly
outstrips the first one (an intuition that all circles intersect in at most two points)? To underscore the
difference at stake, suppose the problem of intuitive presence were indeed perfectly analogous to the
problem of perceptual presence. If so, then the right question to ask would be 'why do you have one kind
of visualisation rather than another?'. That is, why do you have a visualisation that seems to reveal that
every  pair  of  circles  has  at  most  two  common points  rather  than  just  visualising that  those  circles
considered do? The fact that this question is nonsensical highlights the structural difference between the
two problems.
Despite this important difference, I maintain that the problem of intuitive presence is indeed a version of
the problem of perceptual presence. That is because at a certain level of abstraction, both raise a similar
kind of question: namely, how do we account for the fact that some mental states purport to reveal more
to us than what we would reasonably expect them to? For instance, after receiving sensory stimuli from
only the front face of the apple, we may reasonably expect to have a perceptual experience that seems to
reveal only that; yet we have a perceptual experience that seems to reveal a whole apple. Similarly, after
visualising  a single instance of two circles intersecting, we may reasonably expect to have an intuition
that seems to reveal only that those particular circles have at most two common points. However, we have
the intuition that seems to reveal an abstract truth about all circles. The mental events involved in these
two cases are of course distinct; but, arguably, both bear the important structural commonality mentioned
above. In this sense, I take it that developments in debates about the problem of perceptual presence may
prove instructive  for tackling the problem of intuitive presence. I develop this idea further in the next
section.
5. Sketching a solution
In this section,  I consider and evaluate potential  solutions for the problem of intuitive presence.  My
approach will be to survey prominent accounts attempting to solve the problem of perceptual presence
and then sketch analogous proposals for the problem of intuitive presence. I then assess these analogous
proposals. My aim is to show that we have good reasons to further explore the prospects of an enactivist
view of intuitions.5
5.1. Doxastic accounts
One potential solution to the problem of perceptual presence invokes doxastic accounts of perceptual
experience. The core claim of these accounts is that beliefs,  judgements, or inclinations to believe or
judge are poised to shape perceptual experiences. Assuming this is right, it can be argued that when you
receive sensory stimuli from the front face of an apple, you judge or believe (or have an inclination to
judge or believe) that there is a whole voluminous apple there. Moreover, this can presumably be taken to
give rise to a perceptual experience that seems to reveal a whole voluminous apple to you.6
Although seemingly plausible, some have argued that appealing to doxastic states or inclinations cannot
help us solve the problem of perceptual presence.7 The Kanizsa triangle visual illusion is useful to clarify
5 One suggestion I do not develop at length is that intuition is a sui generis mental state and that one of its distinctive features is
that it outstrips what we directly entertain in our minds. This would amount to a kind of ‘solution’ insofar as it suggests the
problem of intuitive presence is not really a problem at all. I have no knock-down argument against this proposal; however, I
take it to be motivated only if we have good reasons to think other potential solutions fail. But, as I explain in what follows,
there is reason to think an enactivist view of intuition proves promising.
6  Dokic (2018) appears to defend this proposal.
7  Noë (2004, p.60) explicitly argues for this; and, arguably, Merleau-Ponty (1962) advances an argument to this effect as well.
this view (see figure 1 below).
Most people will have a visual experience that seems to reveal an upright solid white triangle when they
look at figure 1. It is however clear that there is no solid white triangle there. The Kanizsa triangle is thus
another  instance of  the  problem of  perceptual  presence:  your  perceptual  experience of  a  solid  white
triangle outstrips the sensory stimuli received from figure 1.  Now, what is crucial to emphasise is that
most people will not believe or judge (or be inclined to believe or judge) that there really is a white solid
triangle there. Thus, there seems to be no relevant doxastic state or inclination we can invoke to account
for the gap between what we see in Figure 1 and our perceptual experience of seeming to have a white
triangle revealed to us. This then suggests that appeals to doxastic accounts of perceptual experience  will
fail to solve the problem of perceptual presence.
Analogous considerations can be given for the problem of intuitive presence. To illustrate, consider the
well-known case of Mary the neuroscientist:
Colour-blind:  Mary knows every scientific fact  there is  about colour vision.  Sadly,  Mary was born
entirely colour-blind. As a result, she sees everything in shades of black and white. After undergoing
corrective surgery for this condition, she sets eyes on a red rose for the first time. Does Mary learn
something new at that moment?
Figure 1: Figure 1
If the reader is like me, you will  have an intuition that seems to reveal to you that Mary does learn
something new. Furthermore, I contend that this intuition is another instance of the problem of intuitive
presence. For, note that this intuition outstrips the details of the scenario described in  Colour-blind—
which does not mention that Mary does learn something new. Now, what is crucial to emphasise is that
some people who report having  this intuition ultimately reject  it.  For instance,  Frank Jackson (2003)
claims that he shares  this intuition; but, he argues that since it turns on a mistaken conception of the
nature of perceptual experience, then we should conclude that Mary does not learn something new when
she sees the red rose. Jackson thus presumably does not believe or judge (and neither is he inclined to
believe or judge) that Mary learns something new in this case. But if Jackson does not believe or judge
(nor is inclined to believe or judge) as much, then there does not seem to be any relevant doxastic state or
inclination we can appeal to in order to explain his intuition.  This then  arguably shows that doxastic
accounts of intuition cannot help us solve the problem of intuitive presence.
In sum, solutions that invoke doxastic accounts of intuitions seem to fail because there are cases of people
who have an intuition that p, yet do not believe, judge, or are inclined to believe or judge that p. To a first
approximation, this  argument  might seem compelling. However,  proponents of doxastic accounts  have
adopted two different strategies to try to show that their views can indeed capture these kinds of cases.
The first strategy is to acknowledge that one can have an intuition that p and not believe or judge that p,
but to insist that in these cases one will nevertheless have an inclination to believe or judge accordingly
(Williamson,  2007; Earlenbaugh and Molyneux,  2009). So,  when Jackson has an intuition that  Mary
learns something new, he will not believe or judge that this is the case, but he will still be  inclined to
believe or judge as much—an inclination which he eventually resists. The second strategy is to claim that
having an intuition that p is reducible to a doxastic state or inclination with a different content—other than
p. One way of fleshing out this proposal is to say that having an intuition that p is the same as having a
belief (or an inclination to believe) that one is in a mental state M that provides evidence for p (see, e.g.,
Conee, 2013; Tooley, 2013).8 Crucially, this falls short of actually believing or being inclined to believe p
itself. So, when Jackson has an intuition that Mary learns something new, he may indeed not believe or be
inclined to believe accordingly; however, he still believes (or is inclined to believe) that the mental state
he is in after considering Colour-blind provides evidence that Mary learns something new.
In effect, both  these strategies  claim  that having an intuition  is the same as having a  doxastic state or
inclination of some sort. If this is correct, then the objections discussed above would fail: there is indeed
8 Notably, the views advanced by Conee and Tooley are about the nature of seemings. Here, I am taking on the plausible (and
widely-endorsed) assumption that intuitions are seemings.
some doxastic state or inclination we can appeal to in order to try to account for the problem of intuitive
presence. However, it is notable that both these strategies have themselves been independently criticised.
For instance, Chudnoff (2013, pp.41–44) argues that proponents of the first  strategy face a dilemma:
either the doxastic inclination in question is conscious or it is not. He explains that if it is conscious, then
it should be apparent to anyone who has an intuition that  p that they have an inclination to believe or
judge accordingly. However, he points that there are cases where we have intuitions without any such
doxastic inclinations. I agree. As already mentioned, I have the intuition that Mary learns something new
when I consider Colour-blind. However, I can safely report that I do not have a conscious inclination to
believe or judge as much. To claim otherwise would effectively beg the question. This then leads us to the
second horn of the dilemma: the doxastic inclination is unconscious. Chudnoff argues that if this is the
case, then it is hard to see how the doxastic inclination contributes to the overall phenomenal character of
our  intuition.  And since  the  problem of  intuitive  presence  is  a  puzzle  about  the  phenomenology of
intuitions, then I contend that appealing to this first strategy will fail to solve this problem.9
Let's now turn to critiques of the second strategy—specifically of the claim that having an intuition that p
is the same as having a doxastic state or inclination that one's mental state is evidence for  p.  Recent
arguments by Michael Huemer (2013)  suggest that this  proposal fails. His arguments focus on cases of
perceptual experiences; but as we will see, they apply just as well to cases of intuitions. In effect, Huemer
contends that  believing  or  being  inclined to  believe  that  one's  mental  state  is  evidence for  p is  not
necessary for having a perceptual experience that p. Consider the case of an external-world sceptic who
does not believe or is inclined to believe that her mental states are evidence for claims about the external
world. Nevertheless, this sceptic presumably still has perceptual experiences that seem to reveal there is
an external world to her. Similar considerations extend to cases of intuitions. A person who is convinced
intuitions do not provide evidence for anything whatsoever presumably still has intuitions that seem to
reveal things to her—even if she does not believe or is inclined to believe that her intuitions provide
evidence  for  any  particular  claim.  Taken  together  with  the  other  arguments  discussed  above,  this
objection shows that, in at least some cases, there does not seem to be a doxastic state or inclination we
can appeal to in order to explain cases of the problem of intuitive presence.
In sum, there are reasons to be sceptical that doxastic accounts will help us solve the problem of intuitive
presence. Now, I am not claiming that these critiques provide knock-down arguments against attempts to
invoke doxastic accounts for this purpose. However, I maintain that they underscore significant concerns
about such an approach. In light of these issues, I suggest we explore alternative solutions.
9  For additional critiques of this first strategy, see Koksvik (2020 ch. 2.7) and Bengson (2015).
5.2. Imagination-based solutions
Another recently influential attempt to solve the problem of perceptual presence appeals to capacities for
imagination. The particular conception of imagination at issue in this proposal refers to the distinctive
mental state of forming a mental image. In this view, to say that one imagines a white cup is to say that
one has a quasi-perceptual image of a white cup in the "mind's eye".
Imagination-based solutions to the problem of perceptual presence rely on two central premises: i) that
episodes of imagination and perceptual experiences share a similar phenomenological profile; and ii) that
by  virtue  of  this,  episodes  of  imagination  are  poised  to  contribute  to  the  phenomenal  character  of
perceptual experiences (Kind, 2018; cf. Nanay, 2010). The first of these claims gains traction in light of
empirical  findings,  which  show that  imagination  and  perceptual  experience  can  sometimes  be
indistinguishable  (Perky,  1910).  Building on these findings,  many have  argued that  imagination and
perceptual experiences (at least sometimes) have a similar phenomenology (Nanay, 2010; Kind, 2018).
Now,  this  is  not  to  say that  imagination has  precisely the  same phenomenal  character  as  perceptual
experiences. After all, imaginings will not purport to reveal things in the world in  the same way that
perceptual experiences do. But, given there are at least some significant phenomenological similarities,
then it seems plausible that imaginings may sometimes contribute to the overall phenomenal character of
perceptual  experiences.  When taken together,  these claims offer  a natural  solution to the problem of
perceptual presence. On this account, when we receive sensory stimuli from the front face of an apple, we
will come to imagine that there is a whole apple there. This episode of imagining will have a particular
phenomenological  profile  that  is  poised  to  contribute  to  the  overall  phenomenal  character  of  our
perceptual  experience.  Thus,  our imaginative and perceptual  capacities work in tandem to  produce a
perceptual experience which seems to reveal a whole voluminous apple there.
We can outline an analogous imagination-based solution for the problem of intuitive presence. To get this
proposal off the ground, we can appeal to the idea that similarity in the phenomenology of mental states is
transitive. This means that if some mental state A has the same phenomenology as another mental state B,
and B has the same phenomenology as mental state C, then A and C have the same phenomenology.
Now, if episodes of imagination and perceptual experiences share a similar phenomenological profile, and
so do perceptual experiences and intuitions, then imagination and intuition presumably have this same
phenomenological profile. Furthermore, given that imagination is poised to shape perceptual experiences
by virtue of having this common phenomenological profile, and if intuition also shares that same profile,
then we should conclude that imagination is thereby poised to shape intuitions as well. Accordingly, it
can be argued that what explains the fact that intuitions outstrip what one directly considers in one's mind
is that imaginative capacities contribute to the overall phenomenal character of intuitions.
To a first approximation, this solution to the problem of intuitive presence may appear promising. After
all, appeals to imagination seem well-suited to account for the problem of perceptual presence; and if we
accept that phenomenological similarity is transitive, then we should expect appeals to imagination to
aptly explain cases of the problem of intuitive presence as well. Although seemingly compelling, I will
now argue that this argument fails. To begin, note that it is indeed clear how episodes of imaginings can
help us account for the gap between the sensory stimuli we receive from the world and what perceptual
experiences seem to reveal to us. For instance, it is plausible that when we receive sensory stimuli from
the front face of an apple, we form a mental image of an apple—which, in turn, contributes to having a
perceptual  experience of  a whole apple  in front  of  us.  However,  similar  considerations  do not  seem
available for instances of the problem of intuitive presence. Consider once more the intuition that two
circles have at most two common points. Now, I contend there is no particular mental image that can help
us account for this intuition. For, we obviously do not conjure a mental image of all and every pair of
circles intersecting in our minds. (This would be impossible.) And neither does there seem to be a single
identifiable mathematical property of circles that we can imagine which would bridge the gap between
what this intuition purports to reveal to us and what we directly entertain in our minds. After all, if we had
such a mental image of a mathematical property, I would expect to be able to pinpoint that property.
However, I expect that like me, the reader will be somewhat befuddled if asked to identify what exactly is
this property of circles you purportedly imagine when you have this intuition. In this sense, there seems to
be no particular mental image we can invoke to explain the gap between our intuition that circles intersect
in  at  most  two points and what  we directly entertain in  our  minds.  Thus,  even if  imagination-based
solutions prove apt for the problem of perceptual presence, I maintain they fail to account for the problem
of intuitive presence.
5.3. An enactivist solution
Another recently influential solution to the problem of perceptual presence invokes enactivist theories of
perception.  The  central  tenet  of  such  views  is  that  actions  play  a  fundamental  role  in  perceptual
experiences. However, proponents of enactivism diverge widely in how they develop this thesis. In what
follows, I will focus on the popular sensorimotor formulation of enactivism due to Alva Noë and Kevin
O'Regan  (2001),  as  it  is  perhaps  the  one  that  more  fully  engages  with  the  problem  of  perceptual
presence.10
Sensorimotor enactivism builds on the commonplace observation that over the course of life, people learn
how bodily  actions  modulate  the  sensory  stimuli  they  receive  from  the  environment.  For  instance,
repeated exposure to apples will afford understanding of how, among other things, walking towards an
apple will make it look bigger, how moving one's head around it will allow one to see its other sides, and
how its colour changes under different kinds of lighting. Likewise, after receiving myriad auditory stimuli
from the world, we gain an understanding of how a sound gets louder when we move closer to its source,
how running past  its  source at  a  certain angle  will  change  the  pitch,  and that  sounds  are  perceived
differently  underwater.  These  patterns  in  how  bodily  actions  affect  perception  are  denominated
sensorimotor contingencies.  The main idea of sensorimotor enactivism is that  perception depends on
implicit mastery of  these sensorimotor contingencies.  So, to have a visual experience of an object, one
must  have  an  ability  to  predict,  inter  alia,  how bodily  actions  would  modulate  the  sensory  stimuli
received from that object.
Sensorimotor enactivism offers a natural solution to the problem of perceptual presence (Noë, 2004, p.59
ff.). On this view, even if a perceiver directly attends only to an apple's front face, their deep and rich
understanding of their sensorimotor relations to the apple would suffice to produce the visual experience
of a whole voluminous apple. Likewise, what explains  the perceptual experience  that one is  holding a
bottle even when one is in direct contact with only parts of it is that one has mastery of how moving one's
hand would change the sensory stimulus received from the bottle. More generally then, what explains the
gap between what perceptual experiences purport to reveal to us and the sensory stimulus received from
the environment are these abilities for predicting how bodily actions would affect what one attends to.
The suggestion that enactivism about perception can resolve the problem of perceptual presence raises the
question of whether an analogous view for intuitions is apt to solve the problem of intuitive presence. In
what follows, I assess the viability of this proposal. But, before proceeding, it will be useful to quickly
address an objection in the offing. Although enactivism has proven widely influential, many contest its
tenability (see, e.g., Block, 2005; Prinz, 2006). Accordingly, one might question whether similar concerns
would not carry over to enactivism about intuition. Although I do not have space to fully engage with this
concern here, it is noteworthy that all such concerns about enactivism turn on doubts about the putative
10  Although I  do not  have space to develop this here,  the arguments in this section can be made compatible with other
influential currents of enactivist theorising, such as radical enactivism (Hutto and Myin, 2012) or autopoietic enactivism
(Weber and Varela, 2002; Di Paolo, 2005). However, to achieve this, I believe we must make recourse to some additional
resources from ecological psychology—specifically to the notion of 'mental affordances' (McClelland, 2020).
relation between perception and sensory capacities. Given that by all accounts intuitions do not directly
involve sensory capacities, I find there is little reason to think concerns would carry over to enactivism
about intuition. And so, I put these concerns aside.
Roughly, enactivism about intuitions is the view that actions play a fundamental role in giving rise to
intuitions. What kinds of actions? One proposal that immediately suggests itself is that,  analogous to
enactivism about perception, intuitions depend on  bodily actions. However, this proposal is ultimately
untenable. Bodily actions affect what sensory information we gain from our environment. But, since most
intuitions do not seem to reveal to us things about our environment, then it is hard to see what difference
bodily actions would make to them. Instead, I contend that we should focus on the connection between
intuitions and mental actions. The notion of a 'mental action' refers to episodes in which agents make use
of their cognitive capacities to affect what they intellectually attend to.11 Paradigm examples of mental
actions  include,  inter  alia,  counting  back  from  10,  deliberating  whether  to  get  up  from  the  sofa,
manipulating a mental image, and mentally considering the details of a fictional scenario. In all these
cases, agents employ cognitive effort to modulate what they attend to in their minds.
Focusing  on  this  notion  of  mental  actions  suggests  the  following  formulation  of  enactivism  about
intuitions: intuitions depend in some fundamental way on our understanding of how mental actions would
affect  what  we  attend  to.  This  version  of  enactivism offers  a  promising  solution  to  the  problem of
intuitive presence. To explain, consider once more the intuition that P1 is true—i.e., that two circles can
have at most two common points. On the enactivist solution sketched here, this intuition can purportedly
be explained by recourse to an ability to predict  how mental  actions would affect  what  one directly
attends to in one's mind. Plausibly, the ability in question is that of predicting how some further acts of
manipulating mental  images of  two circles  would yield a  similar  result  to  the  single  case  of  circles
intersecting visualised. In other words, this ability would involve an understanding of how these further
acts of mental imagery would reveal that for whatever pair of circles one brings to mind, those circles
would intersect in at most two points. So, although one brings to mind only the case of the two specific
circles, this ability to predict how further acts of imagining would render a similar result accounts for the
phenomenology of being revealed a universal truth about all pairs of circles.
To further elaborate this enactivist solution to the problem of intuitive presence, consider once more the
intuition that Arjun does not know there is a goldfinch in the tree. As we saw, this intuition outstrips the
verbal description in  Goldfinch.  According to the enactivist  account of intuitions sketched above,  we
11  This definition of mental action is compatible with many of the recent attempts at defining this term (see especially O’Brien
and Soteriou, 2009).
could bridge this gap by making recourse to an ability for predicting how mental acts affect intellectual
attention. I contend that we think of this ability as that of predicting how further mental acts (of, say,
visualisation or imagination) could "fill in" the details of Goldfinch to render it a case which rules out that
Arjun knows there is a goldfinch on the tree. This ability would then account for how entertaining only
the verbal description of  Goldfinch would suffice to elicit an intuition purports to reveal one with this
purported fact.
In sum, enactivism about intuitions seems to offer a viable solution to the problem of intuitive presence.
Of course, a fully satisfactory evaluation of this proposal will require fleshing out the enactivist theory of
intuitions in more detail. I do not have space to provide such a detailed articulation here. However, it is
important to pause and make at least two further observations about this view. First, there is an objection
in the offing that is worth addressing. The objection starts from the claim that imaginative exercises are
plausibly mental actions. After all, I can easily direct my attention to imagine, say, a dancing fox or a seal
wearing a knitted jumper. This then raises the question of whether there is a version of enactivism about
intuition in which imagination plays a fundamental role in intuitions. If so, then concerns I raised for
imagination-based solutions to the problem of intuitive presence would presumably carry over to this
enactivist solution as well (sec. 5.2). The concern would be that there is no particular mental image that is
poised to account for the gap between what intuitions purport to reveal to us and what we directly attend
to in our minds. 
In reply, it is first important to emphasise a crucial feature of the enactivist view sketched above. Note
that although this view posits a link between intuition and mental actions, this  is not to say that mental
acts are  themselves constitutive elements of intuitions. Instead, the view is that intuitions depend on an
ability to predict how such mental acts would modulate intellectual attention. So, even if certain intuitions
are linked to imagination, this does not mean intuitions will depend on any particular imaginative exercise
—but only on an understanding of how imaginative exercises would change what we attend to. Thus, the
enactivist view is not vulnerable to the critique I raised to the imagination-based solutions to the problem
of intuitive presence.
Second, it will be useful to compare and contrast this enactivist view of intuition and an account of the
nature  of  expert intuitions  recently  advanced by  Elijah  Chudnoff.  According  to  this  account,  expert
intuitions are grounded in superior capacities for solving problems (Chudnoff, 2020). Chudnoff fleshes
out  this  idea in  terms of  the  claim that  expert  intuitions  stem from superior  strategies  for  searching
solutions within a given problem space. Let us quickly clarify these terms. A problem space refers to all
elements in a problem, as well as their potential configurations and the end goal. A search strategy in
problem-solving refers to a particular way of (i) representing a problem space, (ii) exploring different
states within the problem space, and (iii) gathering information about which of those states gets one closer
to the goal, and which ones do not. Chudnoff's main contention is that improved performance in any of
these three  components  of  a  search  strategy engenders  expert  intuitions  (Chudnoff,  2020 ch. 3).  For
instance, consider expert intuitions in chess. The problem space in a chess match encompasses all of the
chess  pieces  in  their  initial  configuration,  the  permissible  operations  on  those  pieces,  all  possible
configurations of the board accessible through those operations, and the goal (winning the match). In line
with  Chudnoff's  account,  we  can  say  that  expert  intuitions  in  chess  can  be  traced  back  to  superior
performance in either representing the many possible configurations of the chess board, or in exploring
these configurations and gathering information about which of them contribute to the goal of winning the
match.
Crucially,  Chudnoff's  account  of expert  intuition is  compatible with the enactivist  view of  intuitions
sketched above. To clarify, suppose a chess grandmaster's expert intuition about a particular match stems
from a superior capacity for representing the relevant problem space. Specifically, imagine that this is
because she has the capacity to narrow down the large problem space of a given chess match to only those
few configurations that are likely to lead her to win. In line with Chudnoff's suggestions, we can account
for this capacity in terms of an enactivist view. Specifically, we can say that the chess grandmaster has an
ability to predict how further mental acts of exploring the whole problem space would modulate her
attention,  and  thus  gather  information  about  which  configurations  would  prove  more  conducive  to
winning that match.12 This ability may then guide her in narrowing down the problem space accordingly.
Thus, I contend that Chudnoff's view of expert intuition can be (at least partially) fleshed out in terms of
the enactivist view of intuition.
Now, despite this degree of compatibility between the two views, note that they are importantly different.
Perhaps the most notable difference is that Chudnoff's account is restricted to expert intuitions, whereas
the enactivist  view sketched out  above can presumably account for any intuition whatsoever.  In this
sense, the enactivist view has a broader applicability. A second important difference is that the enactivist
view identifies a particular kind of ability that underwrites intuitions—viz., an ability for predicting how
12  These observations suggest that enactivism about intuitions proves relevant to debates about the so-called 'expertise defence'
(see, e.g., Williamson, 2007). The expertise defence claims that although studies demonstrate that ordinary people's intuitions
are  prone  to  epistemically  irrelevant  factors,  training  in  philosophy  gives  rise  to  a  kind  of  expertise  that  vindicates
philosophers'  use  of  intuitions  in  inquiry.  One  prominent  way  of  fleshing  out  this  proposal  focuses  on  the  idea  that
philosophical training engenders expert  intuitions.  Given we can flesh out the notion of expert intuition in terms of the
enactivist view of intuition (as suggested here), then the latter view may arguably help buttress the expertise defence.
certain mental actions modulate attention. Chudnoff's account, on the other hand, specifies a more general
structure undergirding expert intuitions. And  in this sense, it can presumably be made compatible with
other accounts of the nature of intuitions as well. I will refrain from exploring this proposal in detail here.
Instead, I would like only to emphasise that despite the commonalities suggested above, the two views
considered are indeed distinct.
In conclusion, the enactivist view of intuition sketched above offers a plausible solution to the problem of
intuitive presence. This view is not prone to the objections raised to imagination-based solutions to the
problem of intuitive presence. Furthermore, although this enactivist view is compatible with Chudnoff's
recent account of the nature of expert intuition, the latter is more restricted in its scope and is presumably
compatible with alternative views of the nature of intuitions. In this way, I take it that this enactivist view
is a promising and novel account of intuition that merits further attention.
6. Conclusion
I  have  been arguing that  if  we  take the  perceptual  analogy with  intuition seriously  in  the  way that
phenomenalists  have developed it,  then a version of  the well-known problem of  perceptual  presence
arises for theories of intuition. I have denominated this the problem of intuitive presence. This concerns
the problem of accounting for the fact that the phenomenology of intuitions outstrips what we can directly
entertain in our minds at any one time. I then surveyed different accounts purporting to solve the problem
of perceptual presence and considered whether analogous accounts would be apt to solve the problem of
intuitive presence. After identifying flaws with solutions to the problem of intuitive presence that invoke
doxastic  states  and inclinations,  or  episodes  of  imagination,  I  offered a  sketch of  an innovative and
promising enactivist solution to this problem. These arguments are suggestive for future research on the
nature of intuitions, as they indicate that enactivism about intuitions should be investigated further.
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